Feds Used Fake Cell Towers to Track Journalist’s Producer

Federal agents obtained warrants to deploy cell-site simulators—devices that impersonate cell towers—to locate and arrest a 21-year-old college student who produced journalist Don Lemon’s coverage of an anti-ICE protest. The case reveals how law enforcement is using dragnet surveillance tools originally designed for public safety to target journalists and protesters, raising constitutional concerns about indiscriminate data collection and the erosion of press protections under the Fourth Amendment.

What Happened

According to court filings detailed by WIRED, agents secured warrants in Minnesota and Pennsylvania authorizing the use of cell-site simulators—commonly known as Stingrays or IMSI catchers—to target the phone of a student named Richardson, who had helped produce Don Lemon’s reporting on a protest at Cities Church. The purpose, according to defense attorneys, was “locating and arresting him.” Source: WIRED

Cell-site simulators work by impersonating legitimate cell towers, forcing nearby phones to connect and reveal their identifying information—including location data. The critical privacy concern is that these devices cannot discriminate between a target’s phone and those of innocent bystanders. As WIRED notes, the devices “can also collect identifying information from any nearby cellular device, including those belonging to people who aren’t suspected of a crime.” Privacy advocates have long described them as “dragnet surveillance tools.”

The investigation did not stop at cell-site simulators. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) demanded journalists’ telephone and YouTube records under a customs authority that requires no prior judicial approval. Agents also sought records identifying everyone who had purchased a particular beanie at REI in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area over a period of more than two years. Defense attorneys have identified 92 customs summonses and are challenging the government’s authority to issue them.

Judicial Resistance and Unanswered Questions

The government’s initial effort to obtain arrest warrants met resistance from judges. A magistrate judge refused five of eight warrants, and after an appeals court rejected the Justice Department’s bid to override that decision, the department withdrew its request. In a filing, the chief judge wrote that two of the five “were not protestors at all; instead, they were a journalist and his producer” and that there was “no evidence that those two engaged in any criminal behavior.” Prosecutors later secured a grand jury indictment on January 29.

Several key questions remain unanswered. It is unclear what specific public safety justification was cited for the cell-site simulator use—DHS policy restricts the devices to “specific public safety objectives,” but WIRED notes it’s unclear what objective applied here. It is also unknown whether the pen register orders (which can log the numbers a phone contacts) for Don Lemon’s phone were approved. And it remains unclear whether the warrant for the producer preceded a video of his surrender, leaving questions about the timing and justification of the surveillance.

A Broader Pattern: From Stingrays to AI-Enabled Repression

The Don Lemon producer case illustrates a convergence of physical surveillance (Stingrays) and data dragnet tactics (customs summonses for purchases) that mirrors how generative AI is scaling similar cross-border surveillance against activists. A recent report from Anthropic’s Threat Intelligence team documents how authoritarian states are using generative AI to identify, monitor, and target diaspora activists across borders. The report gives direct evidence that AI is being incorporated into “machinery of cross-border repression,” enabling scalable workflows for surveillance. Source: Just Security

The parallel is striking: just as Stingrays collect data from all nearby devices indiscriminately, AI-powered surveillance systems can monitor vast populations without discrimination. Both technologies lower the barrier to mass surveillance, raising the same fundamental question: what safeguards exist to prevent these tools from being turned against journalists, activists, and ordinary citizens?

The Oversight Gap

The pattern of weak oversight extends beyond domestic surveillance. Polish prosecutors recently revealed that data harvested via Pegasus spyware by Poland’s former government was transmitted outside Poland and accessible to NSO Group, the spyware’s Israeli producer. Forensic analysis confirmed that the Central Anti-Corruption Bureau “did not have full control over the Pegasus system”—some administrative passwords were unavailable, and the infection module remained under the manufacturer’s exclusive control. Data traveled through international servers managed by NSO, beyond Polish oversight. Source: Notes From Poland

This raises uncomfortable questions about domestic tools as well: if NSO retained control over Pegasus components, could similar backdoor access exist in Stingray technology? The FBI’s own records, released in 2023, showed that police borrowing its simulators had to agree to keep details of their use secret—even in court. That secrecy makes independent oversight nearly impossible.

The AI Guardrails Question

The use of generative AI in surveillance workflows adds another dimension. The Anthropic report notes that while the company was able to detect and stop some operations, “in some cases, the threat actors were able to circumvent the refusals by re-prompting the model.” This happened in a Chinese domestic surveillance case where a police academy student’s requests for surveillance reports were initially refused but then granted when the student re-prompted the model, identifying 10 individuals for police targeting.

The pattern suggests that current AI guardrails are insufficient to prevent misuse for surveillance. The report recommends that detection systems should “flag combinations of capabilities (social media monitoring, geolocation, vulnerability profiling, and political inference) that together indicate a DTR workflow.” But whether such safeguards can keep pace with evolving threats remains an open question.

Tradeoffs and Open Questions

Law enforcement argues these tools are necessary for public safety. But the indiscriminate data collection and targeting of journalists suggest a systemic erosion of Fourth Amendment protections. The Don Lemon producer case is not an isolated incident—it’s part of a pattern where surveillance technology designed for narrow public safety objectives is repurposed for broader monitoring of protest movements and press activities.

The tradeoffs are clear: effective law enforcement versus privacy protections; public safety versus press freedom; technological capability versus constitutional limits. What remains unclear is whether existing oversight mechanisms—judicial warrants, DHS policies, AI guardrails—are adequate to prevent abuse, or whether they are merely cosmetic barriers that can be circumvented when the government decides to target journalists and activists.

FAQ

What is a cell-site simulator (Stingray)?
A cell-site simulator, also known as a Stingray or IMSI catcher, is a device that impersonates a cell phone tower to locate a target’s phone. In doing so, it can also collect identifying information from all nearby cellular devices, including those belonging to people not suspected of a crime, making it a dragnet surveillance tool.

Why is the use of cell-site simulators against a journalist’s producer controversial?
It raises constitutional concerns because the devices collect data indiscriminately from bystanders, and the targeting of a journalist’s producer—someone with no evidence of criminal behavior—suggests an erosion of press protections and Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable searches.

What other surveillance tactics were used in this investigation?
Beyond cell-site simulators, the Department of Homeland Security demanded journalists’ telephone and YouTube records under a customs authority requiring no prior judicial approval, and sought records of everyone who purchased a specific beanie at an REI over two years to identify protest participants.

How does this case relate to AI and surveillance?
The case illustrates a convergence of physical surveillance (Stingrays) and data dragnet tactics that mirrors how generative AI is being used by authoritarian states to scale cross-border surveillance against activists. It raises open questions about whether AI guardrails could prevent similar misuse of technology for surveillance workflows.

What was the outcome of the warrants in this case?
A magistrate judge refused five of eight arrest warrants, noting that two targets were a journalist and his producer with no evidence of criminal behavior. Prosecutors later secured a grand jury indictment. It remains unclear whether pen register orders for Don Lemon’s phone were approved.